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 WHY DID THE GREEK POLIS ORIGINALLY
 NEED COINS?
 Why did the ancient Greek polis originally need coins? This question, so
 simple to pose and so difficult to answer, leads to more specific queries such as
 what practical purposes coins served in the polis and what messages they
 communicated either explicitly through their types and legends or implicitly by
 their very creation as products of the political community of the polis. In
 previous work in a related area of the intersection of Greek history and numis-
 matics I concluded that assertions of a direct link between an abstract notion of
 sovereignty and what is sometimes today called the "right of coinage" are
 anachronistic when applied to classical Greece.' This earlier work concerned
 primarily the interruption or complete cessation of coining by classical-period
 Greek city-states that had traditionally minted their own coinages. Its conclu-
 sions were that the evidence did not support the idea that powers such as Philip
 II of Macedon in the fourth century B.C. or Athens in the fifth compelled their
 subjects or allies to cease minting coins as a demonstration of the latters' lack of
 sovereignty compared to the formers' assertion of it and as a suppression of
 local coinage seen as a self-conscious symbol of a state's political identity.
 Rather, I argued, financial pressures best explained interruptions and cessations
 in minting, as, for example, when a polis was too impoverished to secure a
 supply of silver or when the need for locally-minted coinage was obviated by
 the appearance in circulation of widely-accepted coinages produced by another
 mint.
 This argument thus produced negative conclusions concerning what coin-
 age was not for the polis, what it did not signify or symbolize in a political
 sense. In his stimulating re-examination of the consequences that the reign of
 Philip II of Macedon had on the coinage of Greek city-states, Olivier Picard
 points out the need to go further than I did originally and to think about the
 complementary side of the question: what did coinage represent in and for the
 polis, or, to put the question more abstractly, what was the political significance
 of Greek coinage?2 He rightly emphasizes that coinage has "juridical aspects"
 I Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece (Princeton 1985). For arguments from the
 perspective of a modern political scientist also rejecting the idea that the classical Greeks
 had a conception of sovereignty corresponding to modern notions, see F. H. Hinsley,
 Sovereignty (2nd ed. Cambridge 1986) 1-44.
 2 "Philippe II et le monnayage des cit6s grecques," REG 103 (1990) 1-15, who replies to
 Historia, Band XLV/3 (1996)
 ? Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart
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 and is linked to nomos and therefore to civic autonomy (in the Greek sense of a
 polis as a political community that makes its own laws).3 That is, he postulates
 a strong connection between coinage and the political nature of the community.
 What, then, might this connection be? In what ways did coinage have a political
 significance in the Greek polis?
 It is possible to offer one approach to this complex question by investigat-
 ing the connection between coinage and the polis as an internal affair, as a
 matter interior to a single polis, rather than as a matter of economic" or power or
 diplomacy between states, as in my previous work. Furthermore, it seems
 reasonable to hold as a premise of the investigation that this connection had its
 roots in the earliest history of coinage in the polis, which of course does not
 mean that the original reasons for the adoption of coinage by city-states neces-
 sarily remained the only reasons that they continued to mint coins over the
 succeeding centuries. Coinage, like other technological innovations, surely had
 unintended consequences over the long run. In any case, speculation (and that is
 all our evidence allows) about the perhaps diverse reasons why Greeks living in
 city-states originally adopted the use of coinage seems an appropriate way to
 begin thinking about the multi-faceted issue of the significance of archaic and
 classical Greek coinage in and for the polis as a political community. Why,
 then, did the Greek polis originally need coins?
 The current consensus among ancient historians and numismatists seems to
 be that the state's need for a convenient medium of exchange to pay for official
 expenditures motivated the initial adoption of coinage in the Greek polis. That
 is, the earliest coinages in Greece were intended to serve the fiscal needs of the
 state. In the words of Chester Starr, early issues of coins were "occasioned by
 public needs of the polis, which were varied."4 On this view, providing a
 Sovereignty and Coinage (as in n. 1) in so far as it pertains to Philip of Macedon and
 Greece. He argues that the disappearance of coinages with local types reflects "une
 meilleure connaissance des techniques financieres" (p. 15) on the part of the cities rather
 than poverty or an interdiction by a more powerful entity. For further discussion of the
 effect of Philip's reign on Greek coinage, see Catharine C. Lorber, Amphipolis. The Civic
 Coinage in Silver and Gold (Los Angeles 1990) 57-76.
 3 "Philippe II" (as in n. 2) 7-9. Pace Picard, I am not persuaded that the connection between
 nomisma and nomos vitiates my financial interpretation of the Athenian Coinage Decree
 in Sovereignty and Coinage (as in n. 1) 196-207, in favor of one that sees Athens as
 purposely limiting the autonomy of its allies. For one thing, the decree on "weights,
 measures, and decrees" in Ar. Av. 1040-1041 that Picard cites as a parallel to Athens'
 instructions to its allies in the Coinage Decree does not evoke a similar context. The new
 laws ( 1037) that the "decree seller" pitches to the birds are being offered to a community
 devoid of laws, not as a replacement for or suppression of existing laws in an "autono-
 mous" community. The parallel does not hold because the allies of Athens already had
 their own laws.
 4 The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece 800-500 B.C (New York 1977) 112-
 1 17 ("Purposes and Significance of Coinage"), with references to earlier scholarship.
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 medium of exchange for commerce and trade per se was not an important
 motive for the original adoption of coinage by the Greeks.5 A concern for
 revenue may have been a motive, however, because recent research suggests
 that some city-states in Magna Graecia adopted the use of coinage as a way to
 increase their revenues by creating a closed system with a lighter weight
 standard so that they could profit by the exchange of heavier foreign coins for
 those of their system, just as the Ptolemies did much later.6
 "Public needs" of a practical kind, however, are not seen as the whole story
 behind the adoption of coins by Greek city-states. Civic pride is also prominent-
 ly adduced as a fundamental motive for their having begun to mint coins. The
 strongest statement of this position came two decades ago from M. I. Finley,
 who ascribed to the ancient Greeks a "passion" for coins that "was essentially a
 political phenomenon, ,a piece of local vanity, patriotism or advertisement with
 no far-reaching importance' (the Near Eastern world got along perfectly well
 for millennia, even in its extensive trade, with metallic currency exchanged by
 weight, without coining the metal)."7 The basic tenet of Finley's influential
 5 Even Oswyn Murray, Early Greece (2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1993) 237-240, who
 thinks that the importance of trade in the early uses of coinage is underestimated, seems to
 regard the connection as an indirect one stemming from coinage's advantages for ac-
 counting. His view that Greek cities in particular appreciated this advantage of coinage
 when they first adopted its use lends general support to the interpretation presented later
 in this paper.
 Modern economic historians seem inclined to maintain the view that coinage did come
 into existence to serve trade and commerce, postulating that coinage evolved, "without
 government intervention, to facilitate the process of exchange" (apparently meaning
 commercial transactions rather than exchange in an anthropological sense). See, for
 example, Angela Redish, "Coinage, development of," in New Palgrave Dictionary of
 Money and Finance I (London 1992) 377.
 Ancient authors offer mixed opinions on this topic. Hdt. 1.94.1 implies that he saw
 money as an invention to be used in commercial exchange. (Cf. Martin, Sovereignty and
 Coinage [as in n. 11 214-215.) Aristotle does not, I think, say the same thing in his most
 famous discussion of coinage (Pol. 1257alO-bl9), although he is usually cited to this
 effect. His comments on the relationship between exchange and justice in Eth. Nic.
 1 1 33a6-b 1 8 (cf. [Mag. Mor.] 1 194a) must be taken into account in understanding what he
 says in the Politics. More complex still is what to make of what Plato says at Resp. 368e-
 372e on exchange as the origin of the city and the impetus for coinage to be used in trade.
 I discuss these passages in "Coins, Mints, and the Polis," in M. H. Hansen (ed.), Sources
 for the Ancient Greek City-State (Copenhagen 1995) 257-291.
 6 Georges Le Rider, "A propos d'un passage des Poroi de X6nophon: la question du change
 et les monnaies incuses d'Italie du Sud," in Georges Le Rider et al. (eds.), Kraay-
 Morkholm Essays (Louvain-La-Neuve 1989) 159-172. On Ptolemaic Egypt, see Martin,
 Sovereignty and Coinage (as in n. 1) 225-226 and the references there.
 7 The Ancient Economy (2nd ed. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1973) 166. Finley is here
 quoting J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money. Vol. 1. The Pure Theory of Money (New York
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 view continues to be restated in more recent scholarship. In the revised version
 of the Cambridge Ancient History, for example, Chester Starr provides a
 summation of what has usually been the standard view on this point: one of the
 reasons that Greek cities began to mint coins was "no doubt to advertise the
 growing pride and power of the minting poleis."8 The notion that coinage
 functioned as a symbol of autonomy is an analog to this view, for example, as
 expressed by Helmut Engelmann. In his view, coinage in the Greek world was
 from its first appearance "ein politisches Phanomen .... Die Autonomie einer
 Stadt war greifbar und sichtbar in ihrem Geld."9 Similarly, M. M. Austin
 stresses pride as a motive for archaic Greek states beginning to issue coins by
 asserting that "coinage was a symbol of statehood and political identity ....
 Coinage was in general a matter of considerable pride, and this may help to
 explain its rapid spread among the majority of Greek cities from the sixth
 century onward."10 Philip Brook Manville carries the argument a step further by
 relating coinage to a concern on the part of the polis to create a symbol to
 represent a "self-conscious image."' 1 This last statement attributes an extreme-
 ly powerful symbolic significance to Greek coinage in a political context,
 implying that Greek city-states minted coins for the same reason that modem
 states produce, for example, national flags, namely, to function as symbols of
 sovereign identity and serve in political rituals.'2
 1930) 12. To gain an idea of the level of the intellectual and cultural presuppositions of
 Keynes' theorizing, which he bases on his "Illustrations from History," one must quote
 the context of the words extracted by Finley: "When the kings of Lydia first struck coins,
 it may have been as a convenient certificate of fineness and weight, or a mere act of
 ostentation appropriate to the offspring of Croesus and the neighbors of Midas. The
 stamping of pieces of metal with a trade-mark was just a piece of local vanity, patriotism
 or advertisement with no far-reaching importance. It is a practice which has never caught
 on in some important commercial areas .... The Semitic races, whose instincts are keenest
 for the essential qualities of Money, have never paid much attention to the deceptive
 signatures of Mints, which content the financial amateurs of the North, and have cared
 only for the touch and weight of the metal."
 8 CAH III, 3. The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C. (2nd ed.
 Cambridge 1982) 431. Similarly, in his earlier book, Economic and Social Growth (as in
 n. 4) 114, he had cited "pride" as a motive for Greek states commencing to coin (citing
 Duby on the practices of early medieval kings as a parallel). In his more recent discussion
 of the emergence of Greek coinage in Individual and Community. The Rise of the Polis
 800-500 B.C. (New York 1986) 72-73, this motive does not appear.
 9 "Wege griechischer Geldpolitik," ZPE 60 (1985) 165.
 10 "Greek Trade, Industry, and Labor," in Michael Grant and Rachel Kitzinger (eds.),
 Civilization of the Ancient Mediterranean. Greece and Rome II (New York 1988) 734.
 1 1 The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens (Princeton 1990) 171.
 12 For a discussion of symbolism and rituals in politics of the kind that flags can serve, see
 David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven, Conn. 1988) 2-8.
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 These opinions correspond to what I would call the "politics as pride"
 interpretation of the political significance of the coinage minted by Greek city-
 states from the beginning."3 Should we accept this interpretation as a supple-
 ment to the idea that archaic Greek city-states adopted the use of coinage to
 serve their "public needs?" In the remainder of this paper I want to explain why
 I think the evidence suggests a negative answer to this question and what I think
 the evidence does suggest concerning the synergistic relationship that devel-
 oped between the use of coinage and the "public needs" of the polis as it
 increased in scale, became increasingly urbanized, and developed a physical,
 social, and political infrastructure that occasioned increasingly impersonal
 transactions among citizens.
 No direct numismatic evidence exists to support the "politics as pride"
 interpretation because no ancient coinage explicitly proclaims that its existence
 13 Analogous assumptions underlie, for example, the view that Alexander the Great minted
 his coinage to assert his sovereignty. See A. B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire. The
 Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge 1988) 244: "Undoubtedly Alexander's primary
 intentions [with his coinagel were political, to produce an empire-wide coinage declaring
 his universal monarchy. Expressions of local autonomy were discouraged, but as usual
 there is no set pattern .... Alexander's coinage ... was predominant, a universal currency
 that was uniquely and explicitly his." Otto M0rkholm, by contrast, Early Hellenistic
 Coinage. From the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea (336-188 B.C.)
 (Cambridge 1991, Philip Grierson and Ulla Westermark [eds.I) 23, while rejecting the
 idea that Alexander had any "far-sighted economic policy" in mind, explained Alexan-
 der's huge production of coins as a response to his military and civil expenses.
 Naturally, a Macedonian monarch may have attributed quite different political signifi-
 cance to his coinage than did a polis, but in my opinion the case remains unproved that
 Alexander "discouraged" Greek coinages as "expressions of local autonomy;" see Sover-
 eignty and Coinage (as in n. 1) 122-131. The situation in the Hellenistic period becomes
 much more complicated. It is commonly held that Hellenistic kings restricted or sup-
 pressed the "right of coinage" of less powerful entities as a manifestation of superior
 sovereignty. This interpretation is usually buttressed by reference to Maccabees I, 15.6,
 in which Antiochus VII is quoted as granting Simon Maccabeus pernission "to mint
 coins for your own country." Antiochus gives no explicit justification for his power to
 control coinage; it presumably stems from his power as a king to control everything that
 happens in his realm, if he wishes. It seems to me much more likely that considerations of
 profit rather than sovereignty per se induced Hellenistic monarchs to restrict the produc-
 tion of non-royal coinages when they saw an advantage in doing so. (See Martin,
 Sovereignty and Coinage [as in n. 11 242-243.) As Barclay Head observed many years
 ago, Historia Numorum. A Manual of Greek Numismatics (New York 1911) lvii, the
 "right of coining money" was monopolized because such a "useful invention" was
 "recognized as a source of considerable profit." J. K. Davies, CAH VII, 1. The Hellenistic
 World (2nd ed. Cambridge 1984) 280, concludes that the profitability of coinage led to
 monopolies, which in turn led to coinage becoming associated with sovereignty: "... since
 minting was profitable, all kings followed the Athenian fifth-century example and at-
 tempted to control coining within their own territories, to the point where the issue of
 tetradrachms was a symbol of sovereignty maintained ... or autonomy conceded ..."
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 is meant to express pride in the identity of the polis or to assert sovereignty or
 autonomy.'4 Perhaps, however, it is asking too much to require that a symbol
 overtly label itself as such and unfair to expect explicit testimony from Greek
 coins that they were intended to serve as symbols of pride. Perhaps all we
 should expect is that the fact of their existence offers implicit testimony to their
 status as markers of civic pride. Even on this latter condition, however, the
 argument seems difficult to maintain as currently stated because, if an impor-
 tant motive inducing a polis to start minting coins was pride or the assertion of
 identity, it is extremely remarkable that, on Chester Starr's estimate, more than
 half the known Greek city-states appear never to have minted any coins at all.'5
 It seems impossible to believe that more than fifty percent of all Greek city-
 states had such poor self-images or severe identity crises that they forbore
 minting coins.
 In fact, only one piece of ancient evidence is usually cited as supporting the
 "politics as pride" interpretation of the significance of coinage in the archaic
 and classical polis, and this evidence is Hellenistic: a late second-century B.C.
 inscription from Sestos in the Thracian Chersonese.16 The inscription bestows
 honors from the demos on a rich and prominent citizen by the name of Menas.
 One of the actions for which Sestos honored Menas was his official service
 when the city decided to create its own bronze coinage.'7 M. M. Austin
 14 M0rkholm, Early Hellenistic Coinage (as in n. 13) 24, for example, must argue that very
 small city coinages in the Hellenistic period were "most probably produced on some
 occasion when it was found opportune to propagate the fact of the independence and
 freedom of the city" because these exiguous coinages "can have had very little economic
 significance." But the fiscal needs of small ancient cities, whose populations could be
 tiny, may have been quite exiguous by our standards - but not by theirs - on particular
 occasions when coinage was needed or desired. If, for example, mercenaries whom a city-
 state needed to hire for protection demanded their pay in fresh coin and the city-state had
 no easy access to other supplies of coinage, it might on this pressing occasion resort to
 temporary production of its own coinage minted from worn coins of other states found in
 local circulation and then melted down for reminting. Or, short runs of coins may have
 represented failed attempts to profit from minting by creating a new coinage. Whatever
 the plausibility of these particular examples, many Greek cities issued coinages that were
 of no "economic significance" on an international scale but did have such significance on
 the local level. And the decision to mint coins was based on local financial reasons in the
 vast majority of Greek states that ever coined, in my view.
 15 Individual and Community (as in n. 8) 46-47. I discuss this phenomenon further in my
 paper "Coins, Mints, and the Polis" (as in n. 5).
 16 OGISI,no.339.
 17 OGIS I, no. 339, lines 43-51: ... roi. 're xo jou Xrpoe XO 'VO vol?i tpan Xakiciv(ot
 Xpf(oOat i&iot, Xaptv ToV3 vogtevre-eoOat cn v Tr6v 'ri n6Xto% xapaK]rfpa, Cr be
 XucrtTeX?k5x6 TOeptyetv6gevov ?K ri' TOQaiYT; nrpoa6Soio XaIpdvEtv r6v 8fjov, cai
 1CpoXE&putiaevO1) 'Oro; T'fV icrintv jOG ;5;'r Tcal &1Kaio) xnpfoavra;, Mivd; aipe-
 965 ge'r& 'roi3 auvaco8et6X9v'ro; Trv ica"KOrouaav eiavvevKa?o ntVXetav, i4 liv 6
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 translates the section concerning Menas and coinage as follows: " ... and when
 the people decided to use its own bronze coinage (idion chalkinon nomisma), so
 that the city's coin type (character) should be used as a current type (nomei-
 teuesthai), and the people should receive the profit (to lusiteles) resulting from
 this source of revenue, and appointed men who would safeguard this position of
 trust (pistis) piously and justly, Menas was appointed and together with his
 colleague in office showed suitable care (epimeleia), as a result of which the
 people, thanks to the justice (dikaiosyne) and emulation (philotimia) of these
 men, has the use of its own coinage, and in the other magistracies and liturgies
 to which the people had appointed him, he has shown himself impartial (isos)
 and just (dikaios)...."'.8
 When the Sestos text is cited in support of the "politics as pride" interpreta-
 tion of coinage, the reference is customarily confined to the two clauses "so that
 the city's coin type should be used as a current type, and the people should
 receive the profit resulting from this source of revenue." The conclusion is then
 drawn that production of a bronze coinage for the city had two separate aims
 expressed by the two clauses. For example, Ian Carradice and Martin Price have
 recently explained the clauses as saying that Sestos meant "to boost its self-
 esteem [i.e., the first clause] as well as to provide a fair profit to the treasury
 [i.e., the second clause]."'9 I have previously argued against this sort of inter-
 pretation on the grounds that the two clauses are in fact linked in thought not as
 two antithetical points separate from one another but rather with the second
 point (garnering revenue) implicitly deriving from the first (putting a local
 coinage into circulation).20 I remain persuaded that the text says nothing about
 the introduction of coinage providing civic "self-esteem" and therefore does not
 support the idea that the political nature of Greek coinage was a matter of
 "politics as pride." Rather, this inscription only tells us that Sestos desired its
 own bronze coinage because the coinage produced income for the city (assum-
 ing that Sestos was going to impose a currency monopoly in its territory of the
 8igoq S&a tv tov avbpov &icatoavosviv T? Kai 0tXortqiav Xpfrxat rt6 iiot vo,uiagaxt,
 ?V re talt; di apxatc; Kcai Xerot)pyiat;, ci; aS; 6 S1o0 ao&T6v XpoKeXeiptvUat,
 ?iaov awuT6v icat &catov napeiCoilTat ...
 18 The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest. A Selection of Ancient
 Sources in Translation (Cambridge 1981) no. 215, lines 43-5 1.
 19 Coinage in the Greek World (London 1988) 122. Cf. Christopher J. Howgego, "Why did
 ancient states strike coins?," NC 150 (1990) 20, citing the Sestos inscription as proof that
 pride was a factor in a city-state's decision to create a new coinage.
 20 Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage (as in n. 1) 238-241 (with references to earlier scholar-
 ship on the decree). Clauses linked by men and de, as these two are, do not have to express
 a strong antithesis. In the words of J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (2nd ed. Oxford
 1966) 370, "[slometimes giv ... &9 conveys little more than te ... Kai."
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 kind attested elsewhere).2' This profit was simply one of the "useful things" (ta
 chresima) that the inscription praises Menas for accomplishing with his own
 resources on behalf of the city in his support of "the things common to all in the
 city" (ta koina).22 In other words, Menas shared his resources with the entire
 city to support its "public needs."
 The contribution that this Hellenistic inscription makes to understanding
 the political significance of archaic and classical Greek coins comes precisely
 from this wider context of its mention of coinage. So far as coinage is con-
 cerned, the demos of Sestos praises Menas for his pious and just service, which
 has allowed the city to profit. As the inscription reveals, Menas demonstrates
 his eusebeia, his dikaiosyne, and his philotimia by "safeguarding his position of
 trust (pistis)" concerning coinage. The piety presumably refers to the placing of
 images of divinities on the city's coinage, while the justice Menas displayed
 probably refers to his making sure that fraud did not eat away the city's profits
 from minting.23 His self-esteem is the quality that induces him to serve his
 community as zealously, virtuously, and generously as possible. The context, in
 other words, is that of a wealthy and virtuous citizen performing leitourgiai for
 the benefit of the entire civic community.24 Coinage thus is located squarely in
 the liturgical tradition of the Greek city-state as a source of revenue in support
 of ta koina. This context was certainly a political one in various senses because
 it fell within the nexus of social and moral relationships between richer and
 poorer citizens in a polis, in which wealthier citizens were expected, indeed
 socially and morally obliged, to expend their wealth and their personal efforts
 to benefit their fellow citizens. That spending and that service were supposed to
 demonstrate piety and justice on the part of the individual benefactor, as the text
 21 As at Olbia, Pergamum, and (presumably) Gortyna, for instance; see Martin, Sovereignty
 and Coinage (as in n. 1) 208-214, 240; Inscriptiones Creticae IV, no. 162. None of the
 evidence from these places explicitly expresses any concern other than making a profit.
 22 OGIS I, no. 339, lines 7-8, 88, 91.
 23 The bronze coinage of Sestos to which the inscription refers bore images of several
 deities, especially Demeter and Hermes. See Head, Historia Numorum (as in n. 13) 261.
 For the argument that Greeks in the archaic period felt a strong association between the
 types of their coins and the power of the gods, see Jean Bayet, "Iddologie et plastique (I):
 l'expression des Energies divines dans le monnayage des grecs," in Ideologie et plastique
 (Rome 1974) 499-544.
 24 For a brief summary of the types of formal liturgies in Greece and Rome, see the article
 "Liturgy" by A.H.M. Jones in the Oxfiord Classical Dictionary (2nd ed. Oxford 1970)
 613. His emphasis on liturgies being "compulsorily conferred" applies far more to the
 later Roman empire than to the Greek city-states and should not be construed to mean that
 citizens of the latter were usually reluctant to perform liturgies. For more extended
 discussion, see art. "Leiturgie" by J. Oehler in RE XII (1925), cols. 1871-1879. For more
 recent discussion, see also Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric,
 Ideology, and the Power of the People (Princeton 1989) 128, 195 with n. 5, and 199-202.
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 says, while providing concrete and common benefits to the community as a
 whole.
 The return or profit, as it were, to the individual on pious and just expendi-
 ture of this kind would be, first of all, a reputation as a proper and contributing
 citizen, the kind of reputation that was necessary above all in defending oneself
 in court. In some cases, if his benefactions were sufficiently splendid and his
 service excellent, a rich man's contributions would also earn him fame as a
 great man (doxa and euphemia) and election to high public office.25 But even
 the "rich quietists," who wished to stay out of the limelight and shunned the
 public visibility to be gained through office-holding and speechmaking, also
 had to make some benefactions and fulfill the occasional liturgy, if only to
 provide themselves with a defense in law suits tried before juries of their fellow
 citizens.26
 Except insofar as it helped him resist any temptation to profit fraudulently
 from his position as a mint official, Menas' wealth was not in fact directly
 relevant to his particular service regarding coinage because the production of
 coinage was a source of income to the city rather than an expenditure, as the
 inscription makes plain. But coinage in general does lie at the heart of the
 context outlined by this inscription because the text describes numerous other
 benefactions to the city that Menas personally financed.27 Coinage, in other
 words, facilitated his proper participation in the polis, his fulfillment of the role
 he played in his civic community, because he used coins to provide benefac-
 tions to his city in keeping with the Greek tradition of the wealthy supporting
 "public needs."28
 Although he is not directly concerned with this tradition, Robin Osborne's
 recent discussion of exchange in fourth-century Athens makes an important
 related point by demonstrating how wealthy citizens needed coinage to live the
 lives required of them by the social and political norms of the classical polis. He
 25 For the fame that Menas garnered, see OGIS I, no. 339, lines 8-10, 31.
 26 See L. B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian (Oxford 1986) 99-130.
 27 Carradice and Price, Coinage (as in n. 19) 122, are mistaken in saying that one of Menas'
 benefactions was "to pay for the production of the city's bronze coinage." The text clearly
 says that he is being praised for overseeing the minting with justice and piety and that the
 production of coinage was a source of profit, not an expense needing to be paid by a
 benefactor. At most, I suspect, Menas may have provided funds to get the mint started, for
 example, by hiring a public slave and acquiring the necessary tools, but the inscription
 does not say this. When Menas paid for a benefaction, the text says so, as in the
 immediately preceding lines (42-43), which indicate that he himself paid for a dedication
 (of weapons) that the city had voted in his honor.
 28 For a useful brief summary of the background and operation of the liturgical tradition in
 this context, see Vincent Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet. Public Taxation and
 Social Relations (Baltimore and London 1994) 7-8 with the references to earlier scholar-
 shipinn. 13 on p. 230.
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 rejects Finley's model of the economic relationship between town and country
 as one in which the consumer town demands food from the producer country-
 side.29 Studying the case of Phainippus, the landowner who features in Ps.-
 Demosthenes 42, Osborne concludes that "the social and political obligations
 of the wealthy created a need for cash [i.e., coinage] which demanded that they
 enter the market. The goods which they supplied to the market may have made
 possible and indeed encouraged the growth of the town as a population centre,
 but it was occasioned by the existence of the town as a political centre,
 something which is, conceptually at least, quite a different thing. The public
 spending of the polis, and particularly of the democratic polis, can be seen to
 have stimulated both town and country. Wealthy landowners became dependent
 on selling in town markets in order to preserve their wealth and their political
 status ..."30
 This phenomenon existed earlier than the fourth century as well. In the fifth
 century B.C., Plutarch reports, Pericles every year sold all the produce from his
 lands for cash at a single sale and then used the proceeds, which would have
 been in coinage, to pay expenses throughout the year. This procedure irritated
 his family, who preferred to keep stores of surplus food on hand for big
 splurges.31 Philip Stadter argues that Pericles' way of handling his income
 reflects "the increasing monetization of Athenian agriculture in the fifth and
 fourth centuries .... Either Pericles had made a radical shift to raising crops
 solely for market, or he was a poor businessman: the practice as described
 would result in selling cheap, at the height of the harvest, and buying dear....
 Apparently he was trying to put his relatively unpredictable domestic income
 on the same regulated basis he was using for the polis ......32
 I would interpret the story differently, however, as showing Pericles to be
 the ultimate political being in an increasingly monetized Athenian polis. He
 needed stores of ready cash to fulfill the expectations for benefactions created
 by his role as a foremost citizen in the city-state, especially because he had to
 try to emulate, as far as his income allowed, the financial generosity to the city
 as a whole and to individual poorer citizens displayed by richer political rivals
 such as Cimon.33 Pericles was so completely political that he put the desires of
 his family second behind his own need for a store of cash to support his political
 goals. Coinage was basic to the political existence of Pericles and other land-
 owning citizens like him, for whom the city had become the environment in
 29 "Pride and prejudice, sense and subsistence: exchange and society in the Greek city," in
 John Rich and Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (eds.), City and Country in the Ancient World
 (London 1991) 119-145.
 30 "Pride and prejudice" (as in n. 29) 140.
 3 1 Per. 16.
 32 A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles (Chapel Hill, North Carolina 1989) 198-199.
 33 Plut. Per. 10, 16.
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 which they pursued their political ambitions in the council and assembly and
 defended their property and status in the courts, while the country was the
 source of their income. By turning their income from the country into cash, they
 could conveniently make the benefactions and perform the liturgies that gave
 them political capital, capital that they could spend both on offense, as it were -
 to secure the votes of their fellow citizens for high office and for support of
 proposals to the assembly - and on defense - to secure the votes of fellow
 citizens when their enemies or sycophants attacked them with law suits.
 To be sure, it was not necessary, strictly speaking, for coinage to exist in
 order for this sort of social-political system to exist, which imposed both formal
 and informal financial obligations on citizens. Ambitious politicians such as
 Pericles could theoretically have operated in similar ways in a community that
 had money only in other forms, such as bullion or objects of barter. But in
 Greece, I am postulating, the adoption of coinage had a direct connection to the
 evolution of the tradition that obligated wealthier citizens to contribute to the
 well-being of the entire city-state (a tradition that would eventuate in, among
 other results, the liturgical system enforced by law). Thus, coinage functioned
 as an essential mechanism in the evolving political structures of the Greek polis
 at this early stage of development.
 The connection between coinage and what might for present purposes be
 called a proto-liturgical tradition arose in the sixth century B.C. when funda-
 mental changes affected the basic conditions of life in the polis. One signal
 change was increasing urbanization. A relationship between urbanization and
 the use of coinage has long been noticed.34 For one thing, the specialization of
 labor that cities promoted meant that day-to-day commercial exchange was
 more convenient with coinage as a medium.35 But urbanization as a spur to the
 34 See, for example, Starr, Economic and Social Growth (as in n. 4), ch. V ("Cities and
 coinage"), and Individual and Community (as in n. 8) p. 70.
 35 On Greek urbanization before the Persian wars, see Roland Martin, L'urbanisme dans la
 Grace antique (2nd ed. Paris 1974) 75-96. Developments obviously took place at a
 different pace in different places, and our archaeological knowledge is insufficient to
 permit strict generalizations in any case. But the sixth century, especially its latter half,
 was a period when, as at Athens, the pace of urbanization seems to have markedly
 increased. Exchange using coinage in the early Greek city-state, it should be added, was
 probably significantly different from exchange based on currency in most of the contem-
 porary Western world. For one thing, it is usually assumed that early Greek coinages
 tended to lack the small denominations that modern currencies offer. (This assumption
 may be faulty; the apparent lack of small coins may be a result of their being more likely
 to have been lost in antiquity and less likely to be found today. And some early coinages
 did have small denominations, as Carmen Arnold-Biucchi of the American Numismatic
 Society has shown in her work in progress on the early coins of Selinus: "The Beginnings
 of Coinage in the West: Archaic Selinus," in Florilegium Numismaticum. Studia in
 honorem U. Westermark edita [Stockholm 19921 13-19.) Greeks without small denomi-
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 specialization of labor is by itself an insufficient cause for the adoption of
 coinage in the Greek polis because cities had existed for millennia without
 coinage in the Near East.36 Rather, urbanization accompanied by a new form of
 communal organization and the resultant new expectations for the behavior of
 wealthier individiuals in the community provided a favorable context for the
 emergence of coinage in the world of the Greek polis.
 Compared to the ancient Near East, the early Greek polis constituted a new
 form of organization lacking a central authority like a king to compel by force
 the payment of revenues by the members of the community but nevertheless
 including an emerging public infrastructure that demanded large-scale financial
 support. The monarchs of the ancient Near East were accustomed to compelling
 agricultural producers, workers of all kinds, and the upper class to provide
 goods, services, and capital to the state as needed or desired. These kings could
 therefore simply order their subjects to provide the resources, whether as
 capital or labor or both, needed to support the public infrastructure of their
 communities.
 The developing Greek city-state had an analogous need for resources to
 support a growing public infrastructure, both physical and social. The creation
 of cities in Greece reconfigured physical space by creating common areas and
 buildings which no single individual owned or was responsible for and also by
 creating an essential and extensive infrastructure on which all depended for
 survival in common, above all the urban water supply. The need to provide the
 public infrastructure necessary to bring sufficient water to urban areas called
 for construction of aqueducts, systems of pipes, and fountains in central loca-
 tions. These particular public properties also required on-going maintenance -
 nations - or even with them - most likely would have customarily "run a tab" with local
 merchants that they would settle from time to time with coinage as payment, in much the
 same way that people in our world, especially in smaller communities, frequently did
 until relatively recently, when new forms of payment and credit became commonplace.
 36 Furthermore, pace Finley, The Ancient Economy (as in n. 7) 107, coinage had a place in
 the economy of the country as well as the city, or, perhaps one should say, a place in the
 relations between country and city. Ar. Ach. 33-36, could give the impression that country
 folk did not need or use coinage, but that situation could apply only to self-sufficient
 farmers in isolation from others, who by the classical period probably existed only in
 idealizing fantasies. In real life the situation was more complex. Aristotle, for instance,
 tells the story of city people going to the country to buy things, fresh fish in this case (fr.
 517 Rose = Ath. 8.348a-c, from the Politeia of the Naxians). On merchant-middlemen
 buying produce from peasants in the country and then bringing it to the city for resale, see
 Thomas W. Gallant, Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece. Reconstructing the Rural
 Domestic Economy (Stanford, Calif. 1991) 100. Christopher Howgego, "The Supply and
 Use of Money in the Roman World," JRS 72 (1992) 20, remarks on the considerable
 quantity of coin found in rural areas.
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 cleaning out of sediments and repairing of leaks - on an unprecedented scale.37
 Analogously, the development of a civic center went hand-in-hand with the
 increasing development of large-scale, community-wide events to take place in
 public space, especially sacrifices and festivals, that went beyond the custom-
 ary local celebrations serving the needs of restricted groups. This reconfigura-
 tion of physical space and of the calendar of public events entailed a reconfigu-
 ration of social and financial relations in the city-state by creating shared
 responsibilities among citizens for expensive public needs. These responsibili-
 ties could only be met by devising mechanisms on which citizens agreed
 because the city-state lacked a central authority such as the monarchies of the
 ancient Near East, where the king or property-owning priesthoods were the
 owners of "public buildings" and "public spaces" and directly controlled and
 directed the expenditure of the resources of goods and labor that were called for
 to build and maintain these properties and hold celebrations in and around
 them. The increasingly urbanized city-states of Greece had no such central
 mechanism of coercion, except perhaps occasionally in some tyrannies, other
 than decisions of the citizen-body backed by legislation. Tyrants who ruled by
 force could perhaps use coercion to order buildings to be built and civic
 property to be maintained and festivals to be paid for by citizen contributions.
 By contrast, cities ruled by tyrants like Pisistratus, who tried to rule without
 changing the laws, as Thucydides put it,38 and cities governed by oligarchies
 and democracies had no such power of overt coercion to force citizens to pay
 financial contributions or provide labor for civic projects. They had to rely on
 consensus among the citizens.
 37 On the crucial importance of securing a supply of water in the process of Greek urbaniza-
 tion and the needs that it imposed on the polis, see Dora P. Crouch, Water Management in
 Ancient Greek Cities (Oxford 1993) and Martin, L'Urbanisme (as in n. 35) 63-66. For
 Athens, see J. McK. Camp, The Water Supply of Ancient Athens (Diss., Princeton
 University 1977); R. Tolle-Kastenbein, Das archaische Wasserleitungsnetz fur Athen
 (Mainz am Rhein 1994); Michael Stahl, Aristokraten und Tyrannen im archaischen
 Athen: Untersuchungen zur Uberlieferung, zur Sozialstruktur und zur Entstehung des
 Staates (Stuttgart 1987) 241. The growing importance of public water supplies in the later
 archaic period is apparently reflected in art: black figure painters in the later sixth century
 began to produce many, many pictures of fountains. See T. Leslie Shear, "Tyrants and
 Buildings in Archaic Athens," in Athens Comes of Age: From Solon to Salamis (Princeton
 1978) 11.
 On the development of the concept and reality of public property in the polis, see David
 Lewis, "Public Property in the City," in Oswyn Murray and Simon Price (eds.), The Greek
 City from Homer to Alexander (Oxford 1990) 245-263. As he points out, the earliest
 relevant use of the adjective demosion in this meaning comes in Solon fr. 4. H. A.
 Shapiro, "From Athena's Owl to the Owl of Athens," in Ralph M. Rosen and Joseph
 Farrell (eds.), Nomodeiktes. Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald (Ann Arbor,
 Mich. 1993) 213-224, dicusses the meaning of the inscription demosios on a late archaic
 amphora.
 38 6.54.
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 Lacking a central authority to compel contributions or labor through the
 threat of force, the urbanizing Greek city-state had to find other ways to pay for
 and to maintain the common structures and services of its ever more complex
 physical and festal infrastructure. As the Menas inscription implies, one way
 lay in the development of a proto-liturgical tradition, by which the rich contrib-
 uted personally to the financial needs of the city.39 This tradition probably came
 about only gradually and after much strife between rich and poor, at least if the
 histories of Draco and Solon at Athens are any clue to general conditions in the
 archaic polis in this regard. Eventually, however, a political connection of the
 town to the country manifested itself in the obligation, eventually enforced by
 law, of wealthy landowners to distribute their wealth widely to their fellow
 citizens via benefactions and liturgies to pay for new "public needs" of the
 community. This process occurred when the degree of urbanization was reached
 at which it became necessary, if a community was to exist as a sizable polis
 rather than just a village, for the wealthy, who would increasingly have a
 residence in the city as well as lands and a home in the country, to extend their
 obligations beyond the boundaries of their neighbors in the country to the
 citizen-body as a whole.
 Coinage would have proved especially helpful in satisfying the needs of
 this emerging tradition in several ways.40 One was by making it easier for
 wealthier citizens to benefit a larger number of others than they could by
 "payments in kind." Out in the country where their lands lay, wealthy landown-
 ers certainly had obligatory benefactions to make to their local community,
 such as to the deme in the Athenian system, but because of the limited scale
 involved in most cases these rural obligations could have been fulfilled satisfac-
 39 For discussion of the process by which the rich moved beyond largess to their local group
 (whether deme or tribe or whatever) to outlays potentially touching the entire citizen
 body, see Paul Veyne's analysis of what in his discussion of "pre-euergetism" he calls a
 tontine, in Bread and Circuses. Historical Sociology and Political Pluralism. Abridged
 with an introduction by Oswyn Murray. Translated Brian Pearce (London 1990) 71-101.
 Cf. Gabrielsen, Financing (as in n. 28) and Ober, Mass and Elite (as in n. 24). On
 "communal patronage," see Gallant, Risk and Survival (as in n. 36) 148.
 40 ltdouard Will, "De l'aspect dthique des origines de la monnaie," RH 212 (1954) 209-231,
 and "Reflexions et hypotheses sur les origines du monnayage," RN 7 (1955) 5-23, long
 ago pointed out that coinage emerged at the same time that the process began whereby
 patterns of behavior developed through which the community's resources were to some
 extent recirculated from rich to poor. Cf. his "Fonctions de la monnaie dans les cites
 grecques de l'epoque classique," in J.-M. Dentzer et al. (eds.), Numismatique antique.
 ProblWmes et mithodes (Nancy and Louvain 1975) 233-246. Building on Will's argu-
 ments, Thomas Figueira, Aegina. Society and Politics (Salem, New Hampshire 1986)
 111, has pointed out in his treatment of the early coinage of Aegina how coinage, once it
 reached what he calls the stage of prevalence, facilitated, among other things, "certain
 patronage functions of the aristocracy."
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 torily and without undue trouble by means of produce, without coins being
 needed.41 A sacrifice and feast, for example, for one's fellow demesmen in a
 relatively small deme could come directly from the annual production of a
 single rich land owner's herds, gardens, orchards, and vineyards. The situation
 changed, however, once it became expected and, eventually, obligatory for
 wealthy men to make disbursements in the city beyond these "local liturgies" in
 the country. In a large polis, for example, there was no question of one man
 regularly sacrificing enough beasts and providing enough produce from his
 own holdings alone to feast the whole population as a function of his high
 status.42 But with the help of coinage he could, if he had stored up sufficient
 monetary assets, at least treat a large number of people by buying provisions
 from others, as apparently the Athenian general Chabrias did for a time in the
 fourth century. To celebrate his naval victory over the Spartans off Naxos in
 376 B.C., he provided wine every year for participants in the celebration of the
 second day of the Great Mysteries.43 More commonly, richer citizens would use
 wealth accumulated as coinage to pay for services or sacrifices or construction
 that benefited the community as a whole and thus win popular renown.44
 This process was surely at work in Athens during the tyranny of Pisistratus,
 who won his power over aristocratic opposition essentially by extending his
 patronage beyond theirs onto a polis-wide scale.45 Coinage supported this
 process of seeking support among the mass of the population. That is, Pisistra-
 tus tried to assemble for himself from the citizens of the polis what amounted to
 a very large group of clients for whom the tyrant was the patron. Coinage would
 have served an essential role in this process because this patronage was on such
 a large scale. Scale is the issue. An aristocrat in the country had clients on a
 relatively small scale, drawn from the peasants and tenants in and around his
 estates. He would have known who they were and have been directly involved
 in their lives as a fellow participant in local festivals, as a host of communal
 feasts, as a source of a friendly loan of a tool or some seed or even some capital,
 an arbitrator for disputes, and so on in the matters of daily life. The scale of
 things was sufficiently small that the patron would have been known personally
 41 For a discussion of how patron/client relations worked in the Greek countryside, see
 Gallant, Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece (as in n.36) 159-169.
 42 In smaller communities this might be possible on occasion, though certainly not as a
 regular phenomenon. See IG 17.7.389 (Aigale on Amorgos); SIG3 708 (Istropolis).
 43 Plut. Phoc. 6.
 44 See Xen. Oec. 2.5-6 for some of the obligations of a rich man at Athens.
 45 On the Pisistratid tyranny in general, see, conveniently, Helmut Berve, Die Tyrannis bei
 den Griechen (Munich 1967) 41-77; A. Andrewes, CAH III.32 (1982) 392-416. For a
 thorough discussion of the competition between Pisistratus and other aristocrats for status
 and wide support among the citizen body via patronage of religious activities, art, and
 architecture, see Stahl, Aristokraten und Tyrannen (as in n. 37).
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 by the clients and vice versa. Coinage, though it certainly could have been
 useful to the interaction of the rural patron and his relatively small band of
 clients, was not a sine qua non for the exchanges required by this relationship.
 When Pisistratus and then his sons ruled as tyrants in Athens, they were
 seeking clients on a far larger scale than that of rural aristocrats. Theoretically,
 the tyrants were attempting to make the entire polis their clients, but in practice
 they built their power among the non-aristocrats. They had many avenues of
 patronage, and we cannot quantify their relative importance. The Pisistratids
 financed great construction projects, but the usual assumption is that such
 building did not employ large numbers of workers. This may have been true of
 skilled workers for temple construction, but it would probably be mistaken to
 assume further that there were only limited opportunities for hired labor,
 especially for maintaining infrastructure such as the urban water supply of
 Athens that the Pisistratid regime did so much to create.46 The Pisistratids could
 have assembled many clients from the city-dwellers and "near-the-city-dwell-
 ers" able to work every day on construction jobs, maintenance tasks on the
 water supply, and indeed on "make-work" jobs created to be filled by support-
 ers of the regime.
 The number of people who became Pisistratid clients far exceeded that in
 the clientships of rural aristocrats. As in physics, so in history is it true that
 changes in scale entail changes in actions and relationships. The significantly
 expanded scale of the Pisistratid clientele meant that the tyrant had too many
 clients to be able to relate to them in as personal a fashion as rural aristocrats
 traditionally related to their clients. The tyrant could not know all his clients
 personally, he could not show his support by regularly attending their parties
 46 For Pisistratid construction, see R. E. Wycherley, The Stones of Athens (Princeton 1978)
 155-158 and 248; T. Leslie Shear, "Tyrants and Buildings" (as in n. 37) 1-19; John McK.
 Camp, The Athenian Agora (London 1992) 39-48, who emphasizes that the Pisistratids
 built both the southeast fountain house of the agora and the Enneakrounos, the latter being
 "among the most famous of all Athenian buildings" (p. 43). On Pisistratid development of
 the agora, see also Stahl, Aristokraten und Tyrannen (as in n. 37) 233-243. On the
 numbers of workmen used in temple construction, see R. H. Randall, Jr., "The Erech-
 theum workmen," AJA 57 (1953) 199-2 10; Alison Burford, The Greek Temple Builders at
 Epidauros (Toronto 1969) 191-206, 246-251. On the use of hired free labor in agriculture,
 see Alison Burford, Land and Labor in the Greek World (Baltimore 1993) 186-193.
 Ancient Greek sources rarely mention labor for wages, but how could the mass of poor
 people lacking capital and much, if any, land have survived, if they could not work for
 others? Surely our sources are so silent about hired labor because they are so contemptu-
 ous of the banausic population; on this attitude, see Alison Burford, Craftsmen in Greek
 and Roman Society (London 1972) 34, 185. Ellen Meiksens Wood, Peasant-Citizen and
 Slave. The Foundations of Athenian Democracy (London 1988) 70-80, argues that the
 influential work of de Ste. Croix on Xenophon has indeed led to an underestimation of the
 importance of work for hire in ancient Athens.
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 and festivals, he could not personally loan a hoe or an ox or a bag of seed to so
 many clients, and so on. The larger scale and greater impersonalization of
 Pisistratid patronage and clientship made coinage a very useful, perhaps almost
 necessary mechanism for maintaining the relationship between patron and
 client in a time of change, when people were more and more no longer dealing
 with each other on the same intimate scale of personal relationships as in earlier
 times. Coinage, in other words, permitted Pisistratus to develop his expanded
 implementation of patron/client relationships in a way that other, earlier, more
 personal forms of exchange could not so easily allow, at least not in a way that
 was practical under the new circumstances of growing urbanization in the mid-
 sixth century.
 Coinage naturally also suited Pisistratus's new strategy for meeting the
 fiscal needs of the city - his system of taxation - and his personal need for
 defense, which he met by hiring mercenaries. As H. W. Parke said long ago,
 echoing Herodotus, Pisistratus "rooted his tyranny with many mercenaries and
 much revenue."47 The increasing importance of trade through the port of the
 city of Athens also made coinage a welcome innovation in Pisistratid Athens,
 although obviously not because coinage was absolutely necessary to carry on
 sea-borne commerce. Rather, like patronage on a community-wide scale, trade
 on an international scale was also part of the growing impersonalization of life
 in the archaic polis.48 Foreign trade conducted with coinage suited a more
 impersonal world far better than did transactions employing goods for barter.
 Barter required the determination of the value of the goods being exchanged by
 a process of face-to-face negotiation that would frequently have been filled
 with doubt, tension, and even fear.49 For the confidence that made exchange by
 47 Greek Mercenary Soldiers. From the Earliest Times to the Battle of lpsus (Oxford 1933)
 8-9. See the numerous references to Pisistratus and chremata in Hdt. 1.59-64. For
 Pisistratus's creation of a system of direct taxes, see Thuc. 6.54.5 and Arist. Ath. Pol. 16.4
 with the comments of P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia
 (Oxford 1981) 215. On taxation and coinage in general, see Robert J. Littman, "Greek
 Taxation," in Grant and Kitzinger (eds.), Civilization (as in n. 10) 11, 797. In the context
 of raising revenue, fines were analogous to taxes, and coinage suited this context perfect-
 ly. See, for example, the Eretrian inscription from the third quarter of the sixth century
 that specifies the payment of fines in chremata dokima: L. H. Jeffery, The Local Scripts of
 Archaic Greece (Oxford 1961) 84, no. 9A1.
 48 Cf. the remarks of Arist. Pol. 1257a31-33.
 49 For provocative remarks on the "climate of fear" that probably surrounded much ancient
 trade, see David Braund, Georgia in Antiquity. A History of Colchis and Transcaucasian
 Iberia 550 B.C. - A.D. 562 (Oxford 1994) 78, and J.-P. Morel, "Greek Colonization in
 Italy and the West (Problems of Evidence and Interpretation)," in T. Hackens, N. D.
 Holloway, and R. R. Holloway (eds.), Crossroads of the Mediterranean: A Conference at
 Brown University, 1981 (Louvain and Providence, Rhode Island 1983) 149-150. For the
 suggestion that the uncertainty inherent in commercial trading had a powerful effect in
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 barter work well, some knowledge of the other party was highly desirable,
 especially knowledge concerning the trustworthiness of the person. This per-
 sonal knowledge helped establish the value of the goods being exchanged.
 Coinage shifted responsibility for the guarantee of value in exchanges away
 from the immediate parties to transactions, at least for the party accepting
 coinage in an exchange, and thus made it easier for strangers to do business. In
 the country, as opposed to the city and its port, there were comparatively few
 strangers, and exchanges could be primarily face-to-face encounters among
 people who knew of each other and could have some reliable estimate of the
 value of the goods the other party offered as money in exchanges. The more
 impersonal transactions of the city and port were aided by coinage. Above all,
 from the point of view of the tyrant, coinage made it easy to collect import/
 export dues in the harbor.
 Another practical way in which coinage probably facilitated the "public
 needs" of an increasingly urbanized and impersonal polis was in the pooling of
 resources to pay for projects that were beyond the ability of individuals to bear,
 such as, to use a later example, the common sacrifice for which the Athenian
 statesman Phocion claimed he could not pay his contribution (epidosis) because
 of his indebtedness. He advised asking for contributions from the rich, presum-
 ably in analogous fashion to the way Greek city-states raised voluntary contri-
 butions from citizens for a variety of needs and then recorded these virtuous
 donations in public view.50 Under this sort of cooperative system, if the entire
 cost of a public service or a construction project could not be paid by a single
 individual, contributions from different citizens could be pooled with each
 other to make up the necessary total of funds. The use of coinage made it much
 easier to do this sharing of financial burdens in a way that ensured fairness and
 ease of accounting. And ensuring fairness and preventing cheating or underpay-
 ment would have been on contributors' minds at such times, as Plato implies
 transforming traditional social values in European history, see Donald McCloskey, "Bour-
 geois Virtue," The American Scholar (Spring 1994) 187.
 Edward E. Cohen, "The Athenian Economy," in Ralph M. Rosen and Joseph Farrell
 (eds.), Nomodeiktes (as in n. 37) 198, describes the fourth-century Athenian economy as
 one "in which unrelated individuals, often in the city only transiently, sometimes even
 operating from abroad, sought monetary profit through commercial exchange." Mutatis
 mutandis, this unsettling context for exchange arose much earlier in the history of larger
 city-states such as Athens, at the time when financial transactions began to take place
 more and more among citizens who did not know each other as neighbors.
 50 Plut. Phoc. 9. On sorts of projects supported by voluntary contributions, see Leopold
 Migeotte, Les souscriptions dans les cites grecques (Geneva and Quebec 1992) 327-345.
 Cf. Ober, Mass and Elite (as in n. 24) 199-202 on epidoseis in this context. For the
 financing of walls, see also F. G. Maier, Griechische Mauerbauinschriften II (Heidelberg
 1961) 18-21, 55-68.
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 when he has Thrasymachus say that in the relations of the just man and the
 unjust man with the polis in matters such as epidoseis, the unjust man finds a
 way to pay less from an equal basis than does the just man.51 As units of
 established and guaranteed value, coins made it much simpler to be certain that
 a man was paying his allotted portion of the shared costs of a project than if the
 value of each share had to be calculated in kind, which would certainly have
 meant agreeing on values among different kinds of produce and so on. Doing
 such calculations concerning payments in kind would have been extremely
 complicated. A decree from the sanctuary of Oropos gives a glimpse of how
 cumbersome procedures could be under these conditions. The officials are
 obligated to record all donations that the sanctuary receives, they have to weigh
 everything that is not in the form of coin, and they have to put up an inscription
 for public inspection that specifies the amounts that each donor gave by weight
 (and by the plethos of coins). Payments made entirely in coin would have
 greatly lessened the sort of onerous accounting to which this decree testifies.52
 One can also imagine that relying on payments in kind for pooled contribu-
 tions or shared financial responsibilities would have provoked bitter disagree-
 ments among citizens as they made their payments, especially in as disputatious
 a community as the average Greek polis (if one can extrapolate from the
 peevish personality types frequently depicted by Aristophanes, or by Theo-
 phrastus in the Characters). If contributors paid their allotted share by bringing
 in beasts, for example, arguments would surely have broken out concerning the
 relative worth of animals. How would it be fair, someone would complain, if
 that man over there was allowed to contribute a sick old animal while he
 himself had fulfilled his responsibility by contributing a healthy young one
 worth far more? Arguments of this sort would have been inevitable and, one
 guesses, constant, whether the issue was the value of animals or different
 qualities of produce such as grain or olives or wine. It might seem culturally
 limited to think that the polis necessarily needed or wanted to adopt innovations
 to lessen these sorts of disputes, except that such disputes involved considera-
 tions of justice and equity in the relations among citizens, and these were
 certainly fundamental concerns of the new form of social and political organi-
 zation of the polis (regardless of how well these concerns were actually imple-
 mented in practice). The use of coins as payments obviated much of the
 problem of ensuring fairness in contributions. By counting and recording coins
 one could know precisely the value of each man's payment and be sure that he
 had made the appropriate and equitable contribution.
 Moreover, the use of coinage made it much easier to pay workers (whether
 51 Resp. 343d.
 52 IG VII, no. 303.
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 citizens, metics, or public slaves) over the long term as they constructed and
 maintained public infrastructure, the "things common to all in the city" (ta
 koina) of the sort referred to in the Menas inscription.53 Using coins, the polis
 could, for example, arrange to pay laborers in small amounts over time as the
 work proceeded in a satisfactory fashion on a long-term construction project.
 Furthermore, the polis could accumulate ahead of time the money needed to
 give the workers their pay and keep it securely on hand until payday because,
 unlike animals or produce, coins did not die or spoil and were easy to store.
 (The corollary, of course, was that they were easier to steal than bulky food-
 stuffs used as money and consequently required additional security measures.)
 Coins also offered convenience compared to weighed bullion because there was
 no need to argue about their value or the amount that they represented, as there
 would have been with raw metal cut into pieces or other goods. The building
 inscriptions from Athens and Epidauros demonstrate that Greek city-states did
 a great deal of complicated and public accounting of payments.54 This sort of
 financial transaction could theoretically of course have been done in kind
 indefinitely, as they were in the ancient Near East.55 But, in the absence of an
 undisputed central authority like a Near Eastern monarchy to keep disputes to a
 minimum, the increasingly urbanized and impersonal Greek polis could ill
 afford the burden imposed by taking in revenues only through payment in kind,
 which had the same disadvantages as barter: "le troc primitif suppose une
 discussion parfois fort longue sur la valeur des biens 6chang6s ....56
 By improving the process of making payments and receiving revenue and
 by making accounting and recording far more efficient and (potentially, at
 least) more accurate, coinage in a practical way promoted the goal of securing
 justice through exchange in transactions among citizens and foreigners that
 Plato and Aristotle insisted was necessary if a polis was to be a polis.57 Coinage
 was thus, like the alphabet, "'an enabling innovation."58 The benefits that
 coinage brought to an expanding polis, which was largely administered by non-
 specialist citizens rotating in and out of office, made the use of coins virtually a
 necessity once political, social, and financial life achieved a certain (unfortu-
 nately unquantifiable) level of complex interaction.
 53 OGIS 1, no. 339, lines 88, 91.
 54 For the records, see IG 12, nos. 373-374 (= 13, nos. 475-476); Burford, The Greek Temple
 Builders (as in n. 46) 85-87.
 55 See, for example, the way in which amounts in kind are specified by weight in a public
 inscription of around 500 B.C. from an unknown polis in Crete: L. H. Jeffery and A.
 Morpurgo Davies, "A new archaic inscription from Crete," Kadmos 9 (1970) 118-154.
 56 Will, Fonctions (as in n. 40) 234.
 57 Resp. 368e-372e; Eth. Nic. I I 33a6-b 18.
 58 Barry Cunliffe, "Cities, States, and the Transformation of Europe," in Barry Cunliffe
 (ed.), Origins. The Roots of European Civilization (Chicago 1987) 83.
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 Coinage thus served as the ideal medium for gathering contributions, pay-
 ments, taxes, and fines and then disbursing this revenue to pay for ta koina as
 the city-state developed a greater need for this level of financial transaction. It
 is a fitting juxtaposition of urbanization and coinage that Plutarch, presumably
 reflecting his earlier sources, mentions that Theseus minted a coinage for
 Athens immediately after he has reported how Theseus created an urban center
 for the new city that his synoecism had brought into existence.59 The coinage
 and built-up urban center attributed to Theseus are fictions, of course, but the
 connection between the two phenomena is not.
 Another development in the history of the late archaic polis that possibly
 promoted the adoption of coinage was the creation of Greek civic navies. The
 chronology and scope of early Greek navies remain extremely uncertain and
 controversial, but it seems possible that some Greek city-states began to build at
 least a limited number of warships that belonged to the state, rather than to
 individuals, at approximately the same time that they were developing the
 proto-liturgical tradition of contributions by citizens toward public expenses.
 Herodotus implies just such a chronological connection, for example, when he
 reports that the Aeginetans created an early liturgy (a choregia to honor the
 statues of divinities stolen from the Epidaurians) after they began to build
 ships.60 It is usually argued that the ships constituting the earliest Greek navies,
 at least in large part, did not belong to the city-states, properly speaking, but
 came as loans from private owners.61 Even if it is plausible to think that private
 citizens actually built and maintained ships and crews suitable for war, owned
 them in sufficient numbers to be able to constitute a navy of any useful size for
 a polis, and were ready and able to loan these private vessels equipped with
 59 Thes. 24-25.
 60 5.83.1. The precise date, which in any case is not relevant to a possible connection
 between the emergence of a proto-liturgy and publicly-owned ships, is no earlier than the
 late seventh century. Cf. Figueira, Aegina (as in n. 40) 174.
 61 See, for example, Starr, Individual and Community (as in n. 8) 56, and H. T. Wallinga,
 Ships and Sea Power Before the Great Persian War. The Ancestry of the Ancient Trireme
 (Leiden 1993) 8, who argues that civic navies hardly existed before the Persian Wars and
 that few city-states owned significant numbers of triremes before that date. Vincent
 Gabrielsen, Financing (as in n. 28) 24-26, emphasizes that the navies of Greek city-states
 in the late archaic age are to be understood with "a concept of 'navy' that is structurally
 and quantitatively quite different from the 'national' navy created later on" because early
 navies relied on privately-owned ships and not on "a formal, all-embracing network of
 obligations comparable to the later liturgical system ..." I agree with his argument (pp. 30-
 34) that the development of civic navies was a long, gradual process. I have elaborated an
 earlier version of my ideas on coinage and the development of Greek civic navies in a
 paper forthcoming in the proceedings of the Eleventh Naval History Symposium held in
 Annapolis, Maryland, in October, 1993.
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 crews to the state for naval campaigns and military emergencies, it does appear
 that by the late archaic period a competitive navy could no longer realistically
 be maintained by marshaling privately-owned ships. A first-class infantry force
 could still be constituted from hoplites providing their own equipment, but by
 this time a sufficiently sizable and technologically advanced navy could no
 longer be generated from the small supply of men rich enough to provide an
 entire warship solely from their own resources. Rather, constructing a good-
 sized navy in the later sixth century would presumably have required collecting
 taxes and also perhaps pooling contributions from citizens, just as in the mid-
 fifth-century Athenian empire small allied states that could not afford individu-
 ally to provide an entire ship chipped in cash that was pooled by Athens to buy
 ships, or as in the later Athenian syntrierarchy system.62 It seems reasonable to
 think that one of the ways in which Greek city-states originally began to build
 up state-owned fleets was to have citizens pool contributions to pay for the
 construction of some of the city's ships. Very few city-states would have been
 as fortunate as Athens became once the strike at Laurion in the 480s paid for
 more ships out of public revenues obtained without levies on citizens.63
 A convenient medium for collecting taxes and for pooling revenues to
 finance naval construction costs would have been especially welcome as war-
 ships in the late archaic period became larger and more complex and thus more
 costly.64 Although it is perhaps not impossible that this process could have
 taken place indefinitely without the presence of coinage, by the use, for exam-
 62 On the syntrierarchy, see Gabrielsen, Financing (as in n. 28) 173-176.
 63 For the strike being used to pay for ships, see Hdt. 7. 144; Arist. Ath. Pol. 22.7; Plut.
 Them. 4.
 64 Rhodes, Commentary (as in n. 47) 151, suggests that the obscure institution of the
 naucraries was organized to gather citizen contributions for supplying and maintaining
 the city's warships. Cf. Manville, Origins of Citizenship (as in n. 11) 75, n. 23. V.
 Gabrielsen, "The naukrariai and the Athenian navy," C & M 36 (1985) 21-51, and
 Financing (as in n. 28) 20-24, argues that the sources do not show a connection between
 the naucraries and the fleet. For references to the copious previous literature, see Borimir
 Jordan, The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1975) 5-
 16, to which can be added Thomas J. Figueira, "Xanthippos, Father of Pericles, and the
 Prutaneis of the Naukraroi," Historia 35 (1986) 257-279, and Wallinga, Ships (as in n. 61)
 16-32. See J. S. Morrison and J. F. Coates, The Athenian Trireme (Cambridge 1986) 25-
 41, and Chester Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History (New York 1989)
 21-22, on the development of ships with rams, two-level warships, and triremes. See now
 Wallinga, Ships (as in n. 61) passim on the trireme. The Athenian fleet was not numerous
 at this point and consisted mainly of pentekonters, according to Thuc. 1.14, but it was
 large enough for Athens to spare twenty warships to send to the aid of the lonians in 498
 despite the hostilities ongoing with Aegina (Hdt. 5.97.3, 97.1, 6.49-50, 85-93). Athens
 had at least fifty ships by the late 490s (Hdt. 6.89). See Gabrielsen, Financing (as in n. 28)
 30-34, for a healthy corrective to excessive skepticism about the existence of any
 Athenian navy worthy of mention before the later 480s.
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 ple, of precious objects or bullion as media of exchange, the obvious utility of
 coinage in this endeavor would have been given an enormous boost by the
 complicated nature of the transactions required to gather materials and fittings
 for complex warships and to pay the number of craftsmen with the many
 different skills that would have been needed to build a fleet of such warships.65
 As naval technology evolved in the archaic period, first the two-level ship and
 then the trireme were developed, and any state wishing to compete in naval
 power had to be able to finance a fleet of scores of these complex and expensive
 vessels. In fact, the trireme, the most costly and complex of the classical-era
 warships, may just have been appearing in Greek navies by the third quarter of
 the sixth century, around the time when more and more Greek city-states were
 beginning to mint coins.66
 It would certainly be overly simplistic to claim that the development of
 navies or indeed any other single phenomenon in the sixth century "caused" the
 Greek city-states to adopt the use of coinage. Rather, the building of navies
 through citizen contributions and the collection of revenues via taxes might
 have been one part of the evolution of the patterns of liturgical-type behavior
 and financial organization that came to characterize the classical polis and that
 happened more or less at the same time as significant urbanization, which
 meant large-scale common facilities, services, and activities to be paid for and
 maintained with public funds. The point is that, for purposes of collecting,
 pooling, and distributing financial resources for shared responsibilities such as
 maintaining infrastructure or building civic navies or other goals of the devel-
 oping polis, coinage was an essential device.
 In sum, the process of the emergence of a tradition of patterns of public
 behavior, such as the one that later crystallized into the liturgical system of the
 classical polis, had a synergistic relationship to the process of adoption of
 coinage in the archaic polis. In a sense, this development achieved, among other
 things, a modification of the system of gift-exchange characteristic of aristo-
 crats in the period before the emergence of the polis so that it could serve the
 needs of a new kind of political community - the polis - in which the poor were
 participants as well as the rich and in which the rich had obligations to the entire
 civic community, not just to their fellow demesmen or clansmen.67 How sixth-
 65 Large biremes with rams represented major projects in naval architecture, and triremes
 even more so. On the materials and construction of the trireme of the classical era, see
 Morrison and Coates, The Athenian Trireme (as in n. 64) 180-191. It is not known how
 many men it took to build a trireme. See Burford, Craftsmen (as in n. 46) 64. Surely it
 required a substantial crew.
 66 See Starr, Influence of Sea Power (as in n. 64) 22. Wallinga, Ships (as in n. 61) passim,
 agrees on the date but, as previously mentioned, argues that very few city-states had any
 publicly owned triremes this early.
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 century city-states secured revenues to pay for their "public needs" presumably
 varied. Those with harbors could exact duties on trade; those with lands to lease
 or mineral resources to exploit, such as Attica's Laurion mines, could claim the
 revenues as public, and those with tyrants like Pisistratus could institute direct
 taxes on the population.68
 In city-states such as Athens in which the expectation grew that rich
 citizens were obligated to benefit the civic community as a whole, the wealthy
 would have helped bear the cost of public expenditures. The formal system of
 liturgies seems not to have been in place at Athens before the end of the sixth
 century.69 It seems likely, however, that obligations analogous to liturgies had
 commenced at an earlier date, perhaps in the Pisistratid period, and the practice
 of organizing voluntary contributions by groups of citizens to pay for "public
 needs" of the polis has been postulated to have begun in the archaic period.70 It
 has even been suggested that Solon mandated sacrifices and feasts for the
 common benefit.7' As already mentioned, Herodotus assigns an Aeginetan
 liturgy to an early date.72 The costs of civic religion, which constituted activi-
 ties that benefited the entire community materially as well as religiously, would
 have been a significant expense, perhaps the major one, in the early city-state
 and thus required the kind of financing that the proto-liturgical tradition was
 meant to provide.73 The first celebration at Athens of the Panathenaic festival
 on a grand scale, the Great Panathenaia, is traditionally dated to 566 B.C., and
 the Great Dionysia is also usually assumed to have been organized in the mid-
 sixth century or somewhat later, perhaps by Pisistratus.74 In the fourth century
 the expenses of the Panathenaia, such as cash prizes and sacrifices, were paid
 67 For recent discussion of the ideology of gift exchange among aristocrats in archaic
 Greece, see Leslie Kurke, The Traffic of Praise. Pindar and the Poetics of Social
 Economy (Ithaca, New York 1991) 85-107. See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of
 Practice. Translated Richard Nice (Cambridge 1977) 4-15, for anthropological and
 theoretical perspectives on the practice.
 68 Cf. A. French, The Growth of the Athenian Economy (London 1964) 50-52 (on Pisistra-
 tus); A. M. Andreades, A History of Greek Public Finance. Translated Carroll N. Brown,
 I (Cambridge, Mass. 1933) 121 (on tyrants).
 69 J. Oehler, s.v. "Leiturgie," RE XII, cols. 1871-1879; J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied
 Families 600-300 B.C (Oxford 1971) xxv.
 70 For the possibility of an early dramatic choregia, see Max Treu, "Eine Art von Choregie
 in peisistratischer Zeit," Historia 7 (1958) 385-391. On the origins of voluntary contribu-
 tions, see Migeotte, Souscriptions (as in n. 50) 307.
 71 Manville, Origins of Citizenship (as in n. 11) 149.
 72 5.83.3.
 73 Andreades, Greek Public Finance I (as in n. 68) 228.
 74 Jennifer Neils, Goddess and Polis. The Panathenaic Festival in Ancient Athens (Prince-
 ton 1992) 20-2 1; H. A. Shapiro, Art and Cult under the Tyrants (Mainz 1989) 18-21; H.
 W. Parke, Festivals of the Athenians (Ithaca, New York 1977) 33-50, 125-136; Arthur
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 from public revenues, in particular income received from leases on publicly-
 owned land.75 How festival expenses were paid in the sixth century is unknown.
 To the extent that they may have been subsidized by contributions from wealthy
 citizens in this early period, the contributions need not have been made in cash
 in the earliest period of the celebration of large-scale public festivals. The
 enormous sacrifices of the Panathenaia, for example, could have been provi-
 sioned by wealthy landowners contributing animals from their herds, and the
 olive oil that filled the prize amphoras could similarly have come from their
 groves. The amphoras themselves presumably had to be purchased from crafts-
 men, who most likely did not figure among the rich. But eventually coinage
 would have been just as useful in facilitating the financing of cult as in the other
 areas of public interest already mentioned.
 Coinage had a synergistic fit with emerging patterns of social and political
 activity in the late archaic city-state in numerous ways besides any possible
 utility for purely commercial transactions between individuals. Just as coinage
 facilitated, for example, Pisistratus's creation of a large number of clients and
 the imposition of a system of direct taxation, so, too, it supported the process
 through which wealthy citizens began to make benefactions to the demos and
 supply it with liturgical-type contributions and services. One might add that
 coinage also would have served the needs of the rich by making it easier for
 them to satisfy their desire for luxury goods, as Xenophon says,76 to make loans
 to their friends as part of their social interactions, and to extend gifts to the poor
 in times of famine and other crises.77
 In these contexts the utility of coinage for the archaic Greek polis seems
 undeniable, but in fairness one must be careful to distinguish between utility
 and necessity. Neither the evolution in the archaic polis of a tradition obligating
 the rich to make contributions and perhaps collaborate with one another to
 perform or finance "proto-liturgies" for the benefit of the entire civic communi-
 ty, nor the development of systems of taxation, nor increases in trade absolutely
 Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic Festivals of Athens (2nd ed. revised by John Gould
 and D. M. Lewis, Oxford 1968) 57-101. W. R. Connor, "City Dionysia and Athenian
 Democracy," Classica et Mediaevalia 40 (1989) 7-32, argues that the evidence is unreli-
 able for dating the establishment of the Dionysia to the Pisistratid era; he thinks a later
 date is preferable.
 N. Yalouris, "Athena als Herrin der Pferde," MH 7 (1950) 52-54, suggested that all the
 types of the earliest coins of Athens, the sixth-century Wappenmunzen, were associated
 with the Panathenaia.
 75 Parke, Festivals (as in n. 74) 35, 44, 47-48.
 76 Vect. 4.9.
 77 Austin, Greek Trade (as in n. 10) 742; Theophr. Char. 23.5-6; Antiphanes, CAF n, 1 1,
 no. 228. Aristotle, who rejected liturgies as dangerously destabilizing in a democracy,
 recommended that the rich give gifts of money to the poor to provide them with a start on
 a productive existence (Pol. 1304b- 1305a, 1320a-b).
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 depended on the existence of coinage.78 These trends could conceivably have
 continued to evolve even if the Greeks had never adopted coinage, as human
 ingenuity found ways to accommodate social and political needs with other
 media of exchange. Nevertheless, all these phenomena together reinforced the
 appropriateness of coinage in the development of the late archaic polis toward
 its classical form.79 It is surely correct to say, therefore, that early coinage
 served the "public needs" of the "state,"80 so long as one remembers that "state"
 in the archaic period did not mean what it means in today's world of faceless
 and self-perpetuating governmental structures. In the early polis, the "state"
 was constituted by the decisions of citizens and the patterns of behavior that
 they were developing in an emerging and novel political system. As Christian
 Meier reminds us, there was no "state" divorced from society in this era, and the
 polis was identical to the civic community.8' Coinage served the needs of
 society in the civic community in what we call the early Greek polis. And since,
 to quote Meier again, "the strict sense of the word political (politikos) became
 ,appropriate to the polis' ...," coinage was certainly a political phenomenon.
 But it was not "political" in any simple way, and it was not produced to serve
 any single aim. I see no evidence that it was originally produced to demonstrate
 civic pride by standing as a symbol of sovereignty or independence.82 Coinage
 was rather part and parcel of the complex of institutions that contributed to
 making a Greek polis a polis by the classical period.83 Coins - nomismata -
 78 The extent to which Greek trade became monetized is disputed. Contrast the views of
 Murray, Early Greece (as in n. 5) with those of Austin, Greek Trade (as in n. 10) 739-740,
 who quotes ancient sources to show exchange in international trade could and did
 routinely take place without coins.
 79 On this process of change, see Oswyn Murray, "Cities of Reason," in Oswyn Murray and
 Simon Price (eds.), The Greek City (as in n. 37) 13.
 80 See, for example, Starr, Economic and Social Growth (as in n. 4) 116, and Austin, Greek
 Trade (as in n. 10) 734.
 81 The Greek Discovery of Politics. Translated David McLintock (Cambridge, Mass. 1990)
 3-4, 21.
 82 If one is looking for symbolic representation of concepts central to polis identity, it would
 be better to look elsewhere, for example to Roland Martin's idea that the agora symbol-
 ized "l'independance et l'autonomie de la communautd politique" (L'Urbanisme [as in n.
 35] 268) because the agora was used for rituals and behavior that reinforced the city's
 sense of identity. Similar notions could be expressed by monumental architecture and art.
 On Athena's owl as "the official emblem of city" in the context of the interpretation of the
 inscription demosios next to an owl painted on a late archaic amphora as "a self-conscious
 product of the young democratic state," see H. A. Shapiro, "From Athena's Owl" (as in n.
 37) 213-224. Athens had an official public seal, which is attested as early as 397 B.C. See
 Arist. Ath. Pol. 44.1 with Rhodes, Commentary (as in n. 47) 532.
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 were indeed "things of nomos." They were mechanisms for the application of
 nomos in constructing the life of the polis, in particular for central develop-
 ments such as the emergence of the custom that rich citizens would contribute
 financially in shared responsibilities for the benefit of the entire community.
 This is one reason, and a central one, why the Greek polis originally needed
 coins.84
 College of the Holy Cross, Thomas R. Martin
 Worcester, Mass.
 83 Cf. the comments of Howgego, Supply (as in n. 36) 19, on studies of coinage and social
 and political development in Gaul: "It looks as though the production of coinage and the
 subsequent introduction of small denominations are indicative of stages in the develop-
 ment of towns."
 84 In addition to the people who made helpful comments on versions of this paper delivered
 in Calgary, New York, and Waltham, Mass., the following individuals deserve special
 thanks: Carmen Arnold-Biucchi, Gregory Crane, William Metcalf, Blaise Nagy, Neel
 Smith, and especially Kurt Raaflaub.
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